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In this paper we compare the semantical and syntactical deﬁnitions of extensions for open default
theories. We prove that, over monadic languages, these deﬁnitions are equivalent and do not depend
on the cardinality of the underlying inﬁnite world. We also show that, under the domain closure
assumption, one free variable open default theories are decidable.
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1 Introduction
Non-monotonic logics are intended to simulate the process of human reasoning
by providing a formalism for deriving consistent conclusions from an incom-
plete description of the world.
Reiter’s default logic ([11]) is one of the widely used non-monotonic for-
malisms and maybe the only non-monotonic formalism that has a clearly useful
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contribution to the wider ﬁeld of computer science through logic programming
and database theory. This logic deals with rules of inference called defaults
which are expressions of the form
δ(x) =
α(x) : Mβ1(x), . . . ,Mβm(x)
γ(x)
,(1)
where α(x), β1(x), . . . , βm(x), m ≥ 1, and γ(x) are formulas of ﬁrst-order
logic whose free variables are among x = x1, . . . , xn. A default is closed if none
of α, β1, . . . , βm, and γ contains a free variable. Otherwise it is open. Roughly
speaking, the intuitive meaning of a default is as follows. For every n-tuple
of objects t = t1, . . . , tn, if α(t) is believed, and the βi(t)s are consistent with
one’s beliefs, then one is permitted to deduce γ(t) and add it to the “belief
set.” Thus, an open default can be thought of as a kind of “default scheme,”
where free variables x can be replaced by any of the theory’s objects. Various
examples of deduction by defaults can be found in [11].
Whereas closed defaults have been quite thoroughly investigated, very little
is known about open ones. However, interesting cases of default reasoning
usually deal with open defaults, because the intended use of defaults is to
determine whether an object possesses a given property, rather than accepting
or rejecting a ”ﬁxed statement.”
It was pointed out in [7] that when applying open defaults one must specify
all the objects of the underlying theory. Also, it was argued in [3] that one
must distinguish between objects deﬁned explicitly (closed terms) and objects
introduced implicitly (by existential formulas, say).
In this paper we use the semantical deﬁnition of extensions for open default
theories proposed in [7] and [3], where, in contrast to the syntactical deﬁni-
tions in [10] and [11], free variables are treated as object variables, rather than
meta-variables for the closed terms of the theory. The reason for choosing a
semantical deﬁnition of extensions is that, on the one hand, it provides a com-
plete description of the theory objects, and, on the other hand, it distinguishes
between explicitly and implicitly deﬁned objects.
Since the semantical treatment of open default theories allows one to de-
scribe all the elements of the domain under consideration, it has no syntactical
counterpart within the ordinary ﬁrst-order default logic, unless the domain is





where t1, . . . , tm are closed terms ([5]). Under the domain closure assump-
tion, extensions can be described syntactically by extending the underlying
language of default theory with an inﬁnite set of new constant symbols and
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replacing each open default with the set of all its closed instances.
It was shown in [6] that extensions for open default theories depend on
the domain cardinality (cf. [4]) and that over countable 3 or ﬁnite domains,
extensions for open default theories can be described syntactically in ﬁrst-
order logic extended with an inﬁnitary Carnap rule of inference
{ϕ(t)}t∈TL
∀xϕ(x) ,(3)
denoted by C. Here and hereafter T L denotes the set of all closed terms of
language L.
In this paper we show that, when the underlying language of default the-
ory is monadic, the semantical deﬁnition and the above syntactical description
of extensions for open default theories are equivalent and do not depend on
the cardinality of the underlying inﬁnite domain. That is, extensions for
open default theories over monadic languages can be (equivalently) described
syntactically in ﬁrst-order logic extended with the Carnap rule of inference.
Like in the case of explicitly deﬁned ﬁnite domains, the syntactical deﬁnition
treats an open default as the set of all its closed instances over the underly-
ing language of default theory, extended with an inﬁnite set of new constant
symbols. We prove then, that in this syntactical deﬁnition, it is suﬃcient to
extend the underlying language with a countable set of new constant symbols.
As a corollary we obtain that the original semantical deﬁnition of extension
for open default theories over monadic languages can always be restricted to
a countable base.
It should be pointed out that, even though monadic languages are rather
restrictive, many (if not most) examples and case studies of open default deal
with monadic languages.
In addition, we show that, under the domain closure assumption (2), for
uniterm default theories introduced in [1], we may restrict ourselves to a com-
putable ﬁnite base. Therefore, uniterm default theories are decidable.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we recall the notation
and some basic results used throughout this paper. In Section 3 we show
that extensions for default theories over monadic languages do not depend
on the cardinality of the underlying inﬁnite domain. Finally, in Section 4
we show that under the domain closure assumption, extensions for uniterm
default theories do not depend on the cardinality of the underlying domain
and, therefore, we may restrict ourselves to an explicitly deﬁned ﬁnite domain.
3 In this paper, “countable” means inﬁnite countable.
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2 Background
In this section we brieﬂy recall the deﬁnitions of default theories and the Her-
brand semantics of ﬁrst-order logic. We assume that the reader is acquainted
with classical ﬁrst-order logic.
2.1 Default theories
Reiter’s default logic ([11]) deals with rules of inference called defaults which
are expressions of the form (1).
A default theory is a pair (D,A), where D is a set of defaults and A is a set
of ﬁrst-order sentences (axioms). A default theory is closed, if all its defaults
are closed. Otherwise it is open.
2.2 Extensions for closed default theories
In this section we recall the syntactical and semantical deﬁnitions of extensions
for closed default theories.
Recall that closed defaults are expressions of the form
α : Mβ1, . . . ,Mβm
γ
,
where α, β1, . . . , βm, m ≥ 1, and γ are closed formulas.
Deﬁnition 2.1 ([11]) Let (D,A) be a closed default theory. For any set of
sentences S let Γ(D,A)(S) be the smallest set of sentences B (beliefs) that
satisﬁes the following three properties.
D1. A ⊆ B.
D2. Th(B) = B, i.e., B is deductively closed.
D3. If
α : Mβ1, . . . ,Mβm
γ ∈ D, α ∈ B, and ¬β1, . . . ,¬βm ∈ S, then γ ∈ B.
A set of sentences E is an extension for (D,A) if Γ(D,A)(E) = E, i.e., if E
is a ﬁxed point of the operator Γ(D,A).
Next, we present a semantical deﬁnition of extension for closed default
theories. Here and hereafter, for any class of interpretations W , by ThL(W )
we mean the set of all closed formulas over L satisﬁed by all elements of W .
Deﬁnition 2.2 ([2]) Let (D,A) be a closed default theory over L. For any
class of interpretations W , let Σ(D,A)(W ) be the largest class V of models of
A that satisﬁes the following condition.
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If
α : Mβ1, . . . ,Mβm
γ ∈ D, α ∈ ThL(V ), and ¬β1, . . . ,¬βm ∈ ThL(W ),
then γ ∈ ThL(V ).
It is known from [2] that the deﬁnition of extensions as the theories of
the ﬁxed points of the operator Σ is equivalent to Reiter’s original deﬁnition
(Deﬁnition 2.1). That is, a set of sentences E is an extension for a closed
default theory (D,A) if and only if E = ThL(W ) for some ﬁxed point W of
Σ(D,A).
2.3 Herbrand semantics of ﬁrst-order logic
In this section we deﬁne Herbrand semantics of ﬁrst-order logic that is the
basis of the semantical approach to open default theories.
We denote by L the language of the underlying ﬁrst-order logic. Let b be
a set that contains no symbols of L. We denote by Lb the language obtained
from L by augmenting its set of constants with all elements of b. The set of
all closed terms of the language Lb is called the Herbrand universe of Lb. A
Herbrand b-interpretation is a set of ground (closed) atomic formulas of Lb.
Note that closed formulas over Lb are of the form ϕ(t1, . . . , tn), where t1, . . . , tn
are closed terms of language Lb and ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is a formula over L whose
free variables are among x1, . . . , xn. The set b is called the base of Herbrand
b-interpretation.
Let w be a Herbrand b-interpretation and let ϕ be a closed formula over
Lb. We say that w satisﬁes ϕ, denoted w |= ϕ, if the following holds.
• If ϕ is an atomic formula, then w |= ϕ if and only if ϕ ∈ w;
• w |= ϕ ⊃ ψ if and only if w |= ϕ or w |= ψ;
• w |= ¬ϕ if and only if w |= ϕ; and
• w |= ∀xϕ(x) if and only if for each t ∈ T Lb, w |= ϕ(t).
For a Herbrand b-interpretation w we deﬁne the L-theory (Lb-theory) of w,
denoted ThL(w) (ThLb(w)), as the set of all closed formulas of L (Lb) satisﬁed
by w. For a set of Herbrand b-interpretations W we deﬁne the L-theory (Lb-
theory) of W , denoted ThL(W ) (ThLb(W )), as the set of all closed formulas







ThLb(w)). Finally, let X be a set of closed formulas over Lb.
We say that w is a Herbrand b-model, denoted by w |= X, if X ⊆ ThLb(w).
Remark 2.3 It is well-known that for an inﬁnite set of new constant symbols
b, Herbrand b-interpretations are complete and sound for ﬁrst-order logic.
That is, for a set of formulas X over L and a formula ϕ over L, X  ϕ if
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and only if ϕ is satisﬁed by all Herbrand b-interpretations which satisfy X. In
particular, Herbrand b-interpretations with an inﬁnite base naturally arise in
the Henkin proof of the completeness theorem ([9, Lemma 2.16, p. 70]).
2.4 Extensions for open default theories
In this section, departing from Deﬁnition 2.2 and following [7] and [3] we
present a deﬁnition of extensions for open default theories. It is known from [3]
(see also Remark 2.5 below) that for closed default theories this deﬁnition is
equivalent to the original Reiter’s deﬁnition (Deﬁnition 2.1).
We start with the intuition underlying the deﬁnition. There are two types
of objects in the domain of a default theory. One type consists of the ﬁxed
built-in objects which belong to T L and must be present in any Herbrand
interpretation, and the other type consist of implicitly deﬁned unknown ob-
jects which may vary from one Herbrand interpretation to other, e.g., objects
introduced by existentially quantiﬁed formulas. These objects generate other
unknown objects by means of the function symbols of L. Thus, it seems nat-
ural to assume that the theory domain is a Herbrand universe of the original
language augmented with a set of new (unknown) objects, cf. [8, Chapter 1,
§3].
The following deﬁnition of extensions for open default theories is a rela-
tivization of Deﬁnition 2.2 to Herbrand b-interpretations with an inﬁnite set
of new constant symbols b. The reason for passing to a semantical deﬁnition
is that, in general, it is impossible to describe a Herbrand universe by means
of the standard proof theory. The only exception is the cases when the theory
domain is explicitly ﬁnite ([5]), i.e., contains axiom (2).
Deﬁnition 2.4 ([3]) Let b be a set of new constant symbols and let (D,A) be
a default theory. For any set of Herbrand b-interpretations W let ∆b(D,A)(W )
be the largest set V of Herbrand b-models of A that satisﬁes the following
condition.
For any default
α(x) : Mβ1(x), . . . ,Mβm(x)
γ(x)
∈ D and any tuple t of el-
ements of T Lb if α(t) ∈ ThLb(V ) and ¬β1(t), . . . ,¬βm(t) ∈ ThLb(W ), then
γ(t) ∈ ThLb(V ).
A set of sentences E is called a b-extension for (D,A) if E = ThL(W ) for
some ﬁxed point W of ∆b(D,A).
We will also refer to the set b as the base of E.
Remark 2.5 It follows from the Lo¨wnheim-Skolem theorem that, for a closed
default theory (D,A) and an inﬁnite base b, a set of sentences is a b-extension
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for (D,A) if and only if it is an “ordinary” Reiter’s extension for (D,A).
From now on, unless we state otherwise, we deal with inﬁnite bases, be-
cause the cardinality of a ﬁnite base b can be extracted from the b-extension,
which is undesirable in the general case.
Remark 2.6 Note that for two bases b and b′ of diﬀerent cardinality the sets
of b- and b′-extensions for an open default theory do not necessarily coincide,
see [6, Example 7.1].
2.5 Syntactical description of extensions for open default theories
This section contains a syntactical deﬁnition of extensions for open default
theories. The basic idea of the syntactical deﬁnition is, roughly speaking, as
follows. Following [10], we treat an open default as the set of all its closed
instances over the language Lb - the original language L extended with the
base b of Hb.
Whereas over explicitly deﬁned ﬁnite domains, “completeness” of the set
of all closed instances of a set of defaults follows from the domain closure
assumption (2), completeness in the case of inﬁnite domains is a more delicate
issue. The inﬁnite domain counterpart of the domain closure assumption is
the Carnap rule of inference C (3).
Deﬁnition 2.7 below is a relativization of Deﬁnition 2.1 to ﬁrst-order logic
extended with C. We shall need one more bit of notation.
For a set of formulas X we denote by ThC(X) the set of all formulas
deducible from X in ﬁrst-order logic extended with C. We say that a set of
formulas X is C-consistent if ThC(X) is consistent in the usual ﬁrst-order
sense.
Deﬁnition 2.7 ([6]) Let (D,A) be a closed default theory. For any set of
sentences S let ΓC(D,A)(S) be the smallest set of sentences B (beliefs) that
satisﬁes the following three properties.
CD1. A ⊆ B.
CD2. ThC(B) = B, i.e., B is “C-deductively” closed.
CD3. If
α : Mβ1, . . . ,Mβm
γ ∈ D, α ∈ B, and ¬β1, . . . ,¬βm ∈ S, then γ ∈ B.
A set of sentences E is a C-extension for (D,A) if ΓC(D,A)(E) = E, i.e., if
E is a ﬁxed point of the operator ΓC(D,A).
To deﬁne C-extensions for open default theories we need the notion of a
closed instance of an open default.
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Deﬁnition 2.8 Let δ(x) =
α(x) : Mβ1(x), . . . ,Mβm(x)
γ(x)
be an open default.
An instance of δ(x) is a closed default δ(t) =
α(t) : Mβ1(t), . . . ,Mβm(t)
γ(t)
,
where t = t1, . . . , tn is a tuple of closed terms of the underlying language. For
an open default δ, the set of all closed instances of δ is denoted by δ¯, and for
a set of defaults D, D¯L =
⋃
δ∈D δ¯ is the set of all closed instances (over L) of
all defaults of D.
Theorem 2.9 below shows that, in contrast with Remark 2.6, restrictions
of C-extensions for (D¯Lb, A) to L do not depend on the cardinality of the
(inﬁnite) base b. This theorem is our new result, but it naturally belongs to
this section of the background. It is used for the proofs of the results stated
in Section 3.
Theorem 2.9 (Cf. Remark 2.6) Let (D,A) be an open default theory and let
b and b′ be inﬁnite sets of new constant symbols. Then for any C-extension
E for (D¯Lb, A) there is a C-extension E
′ for (D¯Lb′ , A), such that E ∩FmL =
E′ ∩ FmL. 4
2.6 Extensions over countable bases
This section deals with extensions over a countable base b. We start with the
“C-completeness” theorem for which we shall need the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.10 Herbrand b-interpretations (models) with the empty base b
are called a term interpretations (models).
Obviously, term interpretations are sound for the Carnap rule. Theo-
rem 2.11 below shows that if L is countable, then term interpretations are
also complete.
Theorem 2.11 ([6]) Let L be countable. If X is C-consistent, then X has a
term model.
Remark 2.12 It is well-known that Theorem 2.11 does not hold for uncount-
able languages, e.g., see [6, Example 6.7].
Theorem 2.13 below shows that, for countable bases, semantical and syn-
tactical deﬁnitions of extensions are equivalent.
Theorem 2.13 ([6]) Let (D,A) be an open default theory and let b be a count-
able set of new constant symbols. Then E is a C-extension for (D¯Lb, A) if and
only if there is a ﬁxed point W of ∆b(D,A) such that E = ThLb(W ).
4 We denote by FmL the set of all closed formulas over L.
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Corollary 2.14 ([6]) Let (D,A) be an open default theory and let b be a
countable set of new constant symbols. Then E is a b-extension for (D,A) if
and only if there is a C-extension E ′ for (D¯Lb, A) such that E = E
′ ∩ FmL.
Remark 2.15 Note that the above corollary does not hold in the general
case, see [6, Example 6.9]. Thus, as it was pointed out in [6], in order to deﬁne
syntactically extensions over uncountable domains, we have, in addition to the
Carnap rule, to use inﬁnitary languages which allow to express set-theoretic
rules of inference. It seems that inﬁnitary logic is a too high price for a
syntactical equivalent of the domain closure assumption.
3 Default theories over monadic languages
This section deals with the main subject of our paper – open default theories
over monadic languages. We show that for monadic languages b-extensions do
not depend on the cardinality of the (inﬁnite) base b.
We start with the completeness theorem for ﬁrst-order logic with the Car-
nap rule over monadic languages.
Theorem 3.1 (Cf. Theorem 2.11.) Let L be a monadic language. If X is a
C-consistent theory, then X has a term model.
Theorem 3.1 can be equivalently restated as follows.
Theorem 3.2 Let L be a monadic language and let X be a C-deductively
closed set of closed formulas over Lb. Then X = ThLb(V ), where V is the set
of all term models of X.
Combining Theorem 3.2 with Deﬁnition 2.4 we obtain that the set of C-
extensions for (D¯Lb , A) coincide with the theories of ﬁxed points of ∆
b
(D,A).
Theorem 3.3 (Cf. Corollary 2.14) Let L be a monadic language, (D,A) be
an open default theory over L, and let b be a set of new constant symbols.
Then E is a b-extension for (D,A) if and only if there is a C-extension E ′
for (D¯Lb, A) such that E = E
′ ∩ FmL.
Finally, Theorem 3.4 below, that states that for monadic languages b-
extensions do not depend on the cardinality of base b, is an immediate conse-
quence of Theorems 2.9 and 3.3.
Theorem 3.4 Let L be a monadic language, (D,A) be an open default theory
over L, and let b and b′ be inﬁnite sets of new constant symbols. Then E is a
b-extension for (D,A) if and only if it is a b′-extension for (D,A).
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In particular, it follows from Theorem 3.4 that when dealing with open de-
fault theories over monadic languages we may restrict ourselves to a countable
base b, which is not true in the general case, see Remark 2.6.
4 Uniterm default theories
This section deals with uniterm default theories introduced in [1], see Deﬁni-
tion 4.2 below. We show that under the domain closure assumption, when
dealing with uniterm default theories we may restrict ourselves to ﬁnite bases.
For the general case, it is known from [5] that under the domain closure
assumption b-extensions for an open default theory (D,A) coincide with the
restrictions of extensions of (D¯Lb, A) to L.
Theorem 4.1 ([5]) Let (D,A) be an open default theory such that for some




5 and let b be an inﬁnite set of new
constant symbols. Then E is an extension for (D¯Lb, A) if and only if there is
a ﬁxed point W of ∆b(D,A) such that E = ThLb(W ).
Next we recall the deﬁnition of uniterm default theories.
Deﬁnition 4.2 (Cf. [1, Deﬁnitions 6 and 10]) Let L be a ﬁnite monadic lan-
guage. A propositional (boolean) combination of atomic formulas over the
same variable x is called a uniterm formula over x. A default theory (D,A) is
called uniterm if for every default δ ∈ D, all formulas which appear in δ are
uniterm formulas over the same variable.
The main result of this section is that for a uniterm default theory (D,A)
the restrictions of extensions for (D¯Lb, A) to L do not depend on the cardi-
nality of base b (Theorem 4.3). Thus, under the domain closure assumption,
extensions for uniterm default theories do not depend on the base cardinality
either.
Theorem 4.3 Let (D,A) be a uniterm default theory and let b be an inﬁnite
set of new constant symbols. There exist a ﬁnite set of new constant symbols
b′, such that there is an extension E for (D¯Lb, A) if and only if there is an
extension E ′ for (D¯Lb′ , A), such that E ∩ FmL = E ′ ∩ FmL.
Now it follows from Theorems 4.1 and 4.3 that, under the domain clo-
sure assumption, when dealing with uniterm default theories we may restrict
ourselves to ﬁnite bases.
5 Cf. (2).
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Theorem 4.4 Let (D,A) be a uniterm default theory, such that for some
constants a1, . . . , am, A  ∀x
m∨
i=1
x = ai. There exist a ﬁnite set of new constant
symbols b′, such that for each inﬁnite set of new constant symbols b and each
E ⊆ FmL, E is a b-extension for (D,A) if and only if it is a b′-extension for
(D,A).
An immediate corollary to Theorem 4.4 is that under the domain closure
assumption extensions for uniterm default theories are computable.
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